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Abstract
Defeasible logic is a rule-based nonmonotonic logic, with both strict and defeasible rules, and a pri-
ority relation on rules. We show that inference in the propositional form of the logic can be performed
in linear time. This contrasts markedly with most other propositional nonmonotonic logics, in which
inference is intractable.
1 Introduction
Most work in non-monotonic reasoning has focussed on languages for which propositional
inference is not tractable. Sceptical default reasoning is Πp2-hard, even for very simple
classes of default rules, as is sceptical autoepistemic reasoning and propositional circum-
scription. The complexity of sceptical inference from logic programs with negation-as-
failure varies according to the semantics of negation. For both the stable model semantics
and the Clark completion, sceptical inference is co-NP-hard. See (13; 9) for more details.
Although such languages are very expressive, and this expressiveness has been exploited
in answer-set programming (26), for example, they have not led to any practical applica-
tions in non-monotonic reasoning.
There has also been work on more tractable languages. Extensive work on inheritance
networks with exceptions has led to polynomial time algorithms (30) and applications (25).
Defeasible logic (27; 28) is a generalization (7) of inheritance networks with exceptions
under the directly sceptical semantics (17). Defeasible logic replaces the implicit specificity
relation by an explicit, programmable priority relation; generalizes containment statements
between concepts and their complements to rules over literals; and adds the notion of an
explicit defeater. Recent work has proposed other languages (15; 10) which are essentially
subsets of defeasible logic (5).
We have already established that full first-order defeasible logic has a recursively enu-
merable inference problem (22). In this paper we establish that inference in propositional
defeasible logic has linear complexity. Considering the several expressive features of de-
feasible logic, and its low complexity, it appears to be a suitable basis for applications of
non-monotonic reasoning that involve very large rule sets.
In the next section we introduce the proof theory of defeasible logic, which defines the
logic. Then we present a transition system (for a subset of defeasible logic) that progres-
sively simplifies a defeasible theory while accumulating conclusions that can be inferred
from the theory. We show that the meaning of the theory is preserved, and when no more
transitions are applicable all consequences have been accumulated.
The following section presents an algorithm that can be viewed as performing a par-
ticular sequence of transitions. By an appropriate choice of data structures, we show that
the set of all conclusions can be computed in time linear in the size of the theory. Finally,
we use the transformations of (3; 1) to map an arbitrary defeasible theory to the subset of
defeasible logic to which the algorithm applies. These transformations require only linear
time, and blowup in the size of the theory is linear. Thus the result is a linear time compu-
tation of the conclusions of the defeasible theory. This algorithm has been the basis of an
implementation of defeasible logic (23).
2 Defeasible Logic
2.1 An Informal Presentation
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of defeasible logic. A defeasible theory (a
knowledge base in defeasible logic, or a defeasible logic program) consists of five different
kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Tweety is an emu”. Written formally, this
would be expressed as emu(tweety).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g.
facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Emus are birds”. Written
formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such
a rule is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ flies(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it flies,
unless there is other, not inferior, evidence suggesting that it may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to pre-
vent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules by
producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an animal is heavy then it might not
be able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X)❀ ¬flies(X).
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient evidence
to conclude that it does not fly. It is only evidence that the animal may not be able to fly.
In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬flies(X) if heavy(X), we simply want to
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prevent a conclusion flies(X) unless there is more evidence that overrides the heaviness
of X .
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where
one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible
rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a bird
with broken wings can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, with
the intended meaning that r′ is strictly stronger than r, then we can indeed conclude that
the bird cannot fly.
There are several relevant points to be made about the superiority relation in defeasible
logic. Notice that a cycle in the superiority relation is counter-intuitive. In the above ex-
ample, it makes no sense to have both r > r′ and r′ > r. Consequently, defeasible logic
requires that the superiority relation is acyclic.
A second point worth noting is that, in defeasible logic, priorities are local in the follow-
ing sense: Two rules are considered to be competing with one another exactly when they
have complementary heads. Thus, since the superiority relation is used to resolve conflicts
among competing rules, it is only used to compare rules with complementary heads; the
information r > r′ for rules r, r′ without complementary heads may be part of the superi-
ority relation, but has no effect on the proof theory.
Finally, sets of rules with competing heads work as teams against each other. For exam-
ple, consider the following rules about mammals
r1 : monotreme(X) ⇒ mammal(X)
r2 : hasFur(X) ⇒ mammal(X)
r3 : laysEggs(X) ⇒ ¬mammal(X)
r4 : hasBill(X) ⇒ ¬mammal(X)
with the following superiority relation: r1 > r3 and r2 > r4. For a platypus, which sat-
isfies all antecedents, no rule is superior to all competing rules. However, rules r1 and r2
together are superior to rules r3 and r4. Hence defeasible logic concludes that a platypus
is a mammal.
Defeasible logic has some similarities with default logic (29): both are non-monotonic
logics that distinguish statements which are unarguable (strict rules/ facts) from statements
that have lesser force (defeasible rules/defaults). However, there are substantial syntactic
and semantic differences.
First, default logic has no notion of priority among rules, nor of a defeater that cannot be
used to make inferences. On the other hand, default logic permits any logical expression
as a fact or in a default rule, whereas defeasible logic allows only rules as statements.
Nevertheless, even if we restrict attention to propositional default theories (W,D) where
W is a conjunction of literals and D consists of Horn default rules (so that the syntax is
weaker than defeasible logic), sceptical inference is co-NP-hard (9) whereas, as will be
shown in this paper, defeasible logic has linear complexity.
As noted by Nute (28), a central difference between the two logics is in the application of
rules. In default logic the applicability of a default rule is independent of any other default
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rule so that, given default rules : a
a
and : ¬a
¬a
, either default may be applied. On the other
hand, in defeasible logic with rules {⇒ a,⇒ ¬a} neither rule may be applied, since each
rule “interferes” with – or defeats – the other.
2.2 Formal Definition
In this paper we restrict attention to essentially propositional defeasible logic. Rules with
free variables can be interpreted as rule schemas, that is, as the set of all variable-free
instances; in such cases we assume that the Herbrand universe is finite and we regard
variable-free atoms as propositions. For compactness of presentation, we use rule schemas
in examples. However, in this paper we assume that a theory is presented in propositional
form, and not with rule schemas.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notation and basic notions of propositional
logic. If q is a literal,∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then∼q is p).
A rule r : A(r) →֒ C(r) consists of its unique label r, its antecedent (or body) A(r)
(A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow
→֒ (which is a placeholder for concrete arrows to be introduced in a moment), and its
consequent (or head) C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation for
antecedents and sometimes we omit the label when it is not relevant for the context. There
are three kinds of rules, each represented by a different arrow. Strict rules use→, defeasible
rules use ⇒, and defeaters use❀.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R byRs, the set of strict and
defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, the set of defeasible
rules and defeaters in R by Rdd, and the set of defeaters in R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set
of rules in R with consequent q.
A superiority relation on R is a relation > on R. When r1 > r2, then r1 is called
superior to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. Intuitively, r1 > r2 expresses that r1 overrules r2,
should both rules be applicable. We assume > to be acyclic (that is, the transitive closure
of > is irreflexive).
A defeasible theoryD is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of literals (called facts),
R a finite set of rules, and > an acyclic superiority relation on R.
Example 1
We will use the following defeasible theory to demonstrate several aspects of defeasi-
ble logic. We assume there are only the constants ethel and tweety in the language. Let
Dbird = (Fbird, Rbird, >bird) where: Fbird is the set of facts
emu(ethel).
bird(tweety).
Rbird is represented by the set of rule schemas
r1 : emu(X) → bird(X).
r2 : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X).
r3 : heavy(X) ❀ ¬flies(X).
r4 : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X).
r5 : ⇒ heavy(ethel).
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and the superiority relation >bird contains only r4 >bird r2.
The five rule schemas give rise to nine propositional rules by instantiating each variable
to ethel and tweety respectively. Those rules, which make up Rbird are
r1,e : emu(ethel) → bird(ethel).
r1,t : emu(tweety) → bird(tweety).
r2,e : bird(ethel) ⇒ flies(ethel).
r2,t : bird(tweety) ⇒ flies(tweety).
r3,e : heavy(ethel) ❀ ¬flies(ethel).
r3,t : heavy(tweety) ❀ ¬flies(tweety).
r4,e : brokenWing(ethel) ⇒ ¬flies(ethel).
r4,t : brokenWing(tweety) ⇒ ¬flies(tweety).
r5 : ⇒ heavy(ethel).
The rules have been re-labelled purely to simplify later reference1. As a result, the supe-
riority relation becomes {r4,e >bird r2,e, r4,e >bird r2,t, r4,t >bird r2,e, r4,t >bird r2,t}.
As noted in the previous subsection, the two statements r4,e >bird r2,t and r4,t >bird r2,e
have no effect, since they do not involve rules with conflicting heads.
In this defeasible theory, Rs = {r1,e, r1,t} and Rd[¬flies(tweety)] = {r3,t, r4,t}. ✷
2.3 Proof Theory
Defeasible logic is defined by the proof theory presented in this subsection. There are also
characterizations of defeasible logic in other frameworks (22; 14; 20), but they are not
needed here.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal that may be proved by D, and can have one of the
following four forms:
+∆q which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D.
−∆q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in
D.
Conclusions are used only at the meta-level and do not occur in defeasible theories.
Notice the distinction between −, which is used only to express unprovability, and ¬,
which expresses classical negation. For example, −∆¬flies(tweety) means that it has
been proved that the negated proposition ¬flies(tweety) cannot be proved definitely in
the defeasible theory.
If we are able to prove q definitely, then q is also defeasibly provable. This is a direct
consequence of the formal definition below. Similarly, if −∂q is concluded then we must
also conclude −∆q.
Provability is defined below. It is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in
D = (F,R,>). A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of tagged literals
1 Without the re-labelling we would have different rules with the same label. This is not a problem, formally, but
might be confusing.
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constructed by inference rules. There are four inference rules (corresponding to the four
kinds of conclusion) that specify how a derivation may be extended. (P (1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i):
+∆: We may append P (i+ 1) = +∆q if either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
This means, to prove +∆q we need to establish a proof for q using facts and strict rules
only. This is a deduction in the classical sense – no proofs for the negation of q need to be
considered (in contrast to defeasible provability below, where opposing chains of reasoning
must also be taken into account). From Dbird in Example 1 we can infer +∆emu(ethel)
(and +∆bird(tweety)) immediately, in a proof of length 1. Using r1,e and the second
clause of the inference rule, we can infer +∆bird(ethel) in a proof of length 2.
−∆: We may append P (i+ 1) = −∆q if
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
To prove−∆q, that is, that q is not definitely provable, q must not be a fact. In addition,
we need to establish that every strict rule with head q is known to be inapplicable. Thus
for every such rule r there must be at least one element a of the antecedent for which
we have established that a is not definitely provable (−∆a). From Dbird, we can infer
−∆heavy(tweety) and −∆¬flies(tweety) immediately (among many others), since in
these cases Rs[q] is empty.
Note that this definition of nonprovability does not involve loop detection. Thus if D
consists of the single rule p → p, we can see that p cannot be proven, but defeasible logic
is unable to prove−∆p.
Defeasible provability requires consideration of chains of reasoning for the complemen-
tary literal, and possible resolution using the superiority relation. Thus the inference rules
for defeasible provability are more complicated than those for definite provability.
+∂: We may append P (i+ 1) = +∂q if either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us illustrate this definition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have two
choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue us-
ing the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict
or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to consider
possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of∼q. To be more specific: to prove
q defeasibly we must show that∼ q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must
consider the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have head
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∼q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they could not be used to support
the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given in subsection 2.1).
Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule
s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following properties: (i) t must
be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each attack on the
conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule.
From Dbird in Example 1 we can infer +∂bird(ethel) in a proof of length 3, using (1).
Other applications of this inference rule first require application of the inference rule −∂.
This inference rule completes the definition of the proof theory of defeasible logic. It is a
strong negation of the inference rule +∂ (2).
−∂: We may append P (i+ 1) = −∂q if
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
To prove that q is not defeasibly provable, we must first establish that it is not definitely
provable. Then we must establish that it cannot be proven using the defeasible part of the
theory. There are three possibilities to achieve this: either we have established that none of
the (strict and defeasible) rules with head q can be applied (2.1); or∼q is definitely provable
(2.2); or there must be an applicable rule s with head∼q such that no possibly applicable
rule t with head q is superior to s (2.3).
From Dbird in Example 1 we can infer −∂brokenWing(ethel) with a proof of length
2 using (1) and (2.1), since R[q] is empty. Employing this conclusion, we can then infer
−∂¬flies(ethel), again using (2.1), since the only rule r is r4,e. Using r5, we can infer
+∂heavy(ethel) by (2) of the inference rule +∂; (2.3) holds since R[∼q] is empty. Using
(2.3) of the inference rule −∂, we can infer −∂flies(ethel), where the role of s is taken
by r3,e.
Furthermore, we can infer−∂brokenWing(tweety) and−∂heavy(tweety) using (2.1)
of inference rule−∂, since in both casesRsd[q] is empty. Employing those conclusions, we
can then infer−∂¬flies(tweety), again using (2.1), since the only rules for¬flies(tweety)
involve antecedents already established to be unprovable defeasibly. Now, using this con-
clusion, we can use (2), specifically (2.1), of the inference rule+∂ to infer+∂flies(tweety).
The elements of a derivation P in D are called lines of the derivation. We say that a
tagged literal L is provable in D = (F,R,>), denoted D ⊢ L, iff there is a derivation in
D such that L is a line of P . Equivalently, we say that L is a conclusion (or consequence)
of D.
Conclusions are the basis of our notion of equivalent defeasible theories. We say D1
and D2 are conclusion equivalent (written D1 ≡ D2) iff D1 and D2 have identical sets of
consequences, that is, D1 ⊢ L iff D2 ⊢ L.
An important property of defeasible logic is that it is coherent, that is, there is no defea-
sible theoryD and literal p such that D ⊢ +∂p and D ⊢ −∂p, or D ⊢ +∆p and D ⊢ −∆p
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(6). Put simply, this property says that we cannot establish that a literal is simultaneously
provable and unprovable.
Notice that strict rules are used in two different ways. When we try to establish defi-
nite provability, then strict rules are used as in classical logic: if their bodies are proved
definitely then their head is proved definitely, regardless of any reasoning chains with the
opposite conclusion. But strict rules can also be used to show defeasible provability, given
that some other literals are known to be defeasibly provable. In this case, strict rules are
used exactly like defeasible rules. For example, a strict rule may have its body proved
defeasibly, yet it may not fire because there is a rule with the opposite conclusion that is
not weaker. Furthermore, strict rules are not automatically superior to defeasible rules. In
this paper, we will choose to duplicate strict rules as defeasible rules, and require definite
reasoning to use the strict rules (as always), while defeasible reasoning may use only de-
feasible rules. Because of the above facts, this duplication and separation of rules does not
modify the consequences. When there is a duplicate defeasible rule for every strict rule in
a defeasible theory, we say that the theory has duplicated strict rules.
In this paper we will focus on the subset of defeasible logic that involves no superiority
statements and no defeaters, which we call basic defeasible logic. For basic defeasible
logic the inference rules are simplified (1). We simplify them further by introducing two
auxiliary tags for literals (+σ and −σ) and corresponding inference rules.
+σ: We may append P (i+ 1) = +σq if
∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i)
−σ: We may append P (i+ 1) = −σq if
∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i)
These tags (+σ,−σ) represent the ability/inability to find a tentative reason for the liter-
als. Essentially, we can prove +σq when there is an argument for q, but we must consider
all counter-arguments (for ∼q) before we can prove +∂q. Similarly, we can prove −σq if
there is not even a tentative reason for q, but there are other ways to conclude−∂q. Tagged
literals involving σ, ∂ or ∆ are called extended conclusions.
With the addition of these tags and inference rules, the inference rules for ∂ are reduced
to:
+∂: We may append P (i + 1) = +∂q if either
+∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
{+σq,−∆∼q,−σ∼q} ⊆ P (1..i)
−∂: We may append P (i + 1) = −∂q if
−∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
{−σq,+∆∼q,+σ∼q} ∩ P (1..i) 6= ∅
This modified proof system reduces the amount of “work” done in any one proof step
in comparison with the original inference rules, and is the logical basis for the algorithm.
However, the algorithm is also based on repeated simplification of the defeasible theory,
which we describe as a transition system in the next section.
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3 The Transition System
The algorithm is defined in terms of a transition system on states. A state is a pair (D,C) of
a defeasible theory D and a set of extended conclusions C. As the algorithm proceeds, the
theory D is simplified and conclusions of the theory are accumulated in C. The transitions
for the positive conclusions are based on forward chaining. The negative conclusions are
derived by a dual process.
Definition 1
There is a transition (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di+1, Ci+1) only in the following cases:
1. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {+∆q,+∂q,+σq})
if there is a fact q in Di or a strict rule in Di with head q and empty body
2. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {+σq})
if there is a defeasible rule in Di with head q and empty body
3. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {−∆q})
if there is no strict rule in Di with head q and no fact q in Di
4. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {−σq})
if there is no rule in Di with head q
5. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {+∂q})
if +∆q ∈ Ci or if {−∆∼q,−σ∼q,+σq} ⊆ Ci
6. (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di, Ci ∪ {−∂q})
if −∆q ∈ Ci and either +∆∼q ∈ Ci or +σ∼q ∈ Ci or −σq ∈ Ci.
7. (Di, Ci) =⇒ ((Di\{r}) ∪ {r′}, Ci)
if r is a strict rule in Di with body containing q, r′ is r with q deleted, and +∆q ∈ Ci
8. (Di, Ci) =⇒ ((Di\{r}) ∪ {r′}, Ci)
if r is a defeasible rule in Di with body containing q, r′ is r with q deleted, and
+∂q ∈ Ci
9. (Di, Ci) =⇒ ((Di\{r}), Ci)
if r is a strict rule in Di with body containing q, and −∆q ∈ Ci
10. (Di, Ci) =⇒ ((Di\{r}), Ci)
if r is a defeasible rule in Di with body containing q, and −∂q ∈ Ci
We write (Di, Ci) 6=⇒ if there is no transition (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di+1, Ci+1) except those
where (Di, Ci) = (Di+1, Ci+1).
If (D, ∅) =⇒ · · · =⇒ (D′, C′) 6=⇒ and C is the subset of C′ involving only the tags
+∆,−∆,+∂, and −∂, then we say that D derives C.
We demonstrate the action of the transition system on Dbird in Example 1. Transition 1
applies to each fact and transition 3 applies to all literals except the facts and bird(ethel).
Similarly, transition 2 applies to heavy(ethel) and transition 4 applies to several literals,
including all brokenWing literals. These transitions do not modify Di; they only accu-
mulate conclusions in Ci. However, as a result of this accumulation, transition 7 deletes
emu(ethel) from r1,e, which then allows transition 1 to add +∂bird(ethel) to Ci, and
transition 9 deletes r1,t. Furthermore, transition 5 applies for emu(ethel), bird(tweety),
and bird(ethel) by the first condition, and then transition 8 applies to modify r2,e and r2,t;
similarly, transition 6 applies to all brokenWing literals, which then allows r4,e and r4,t
to be deleted by transition 10. Further transitions are possible.
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It is quite clear that, by ignoring defeaters and superiority statements, the transition
system is incorrect for theories of full defeasible logic. The transition system is also in-
complete, in general, for theories of basic defeasible logic. For example, from the rules
a → b
⇒ a
the transition system cannot conclude +σb. But under the assumption that strict rules are
duplicated as defeasible rules, the transition system is sound and complete, as we now
show.
Theorem 1
LetD be a basic defeasible theory with duplicated strict rules. Suppose (D, ∅) =⇒ · · · =⇒
(D′, C′) 6=⇒. If c ∈ C′ then D ⊢ c.
Proof
Consider a transition (Di, Ci) =⇒ (Di+1, Ci+1). We prove, by induction on i, that
• If c ∈ Ci+1\Ci then Di ⊢ c
• Di ≡ Di+1
for every conclusion c.
The first part is straightforward, since the first six transitions are essentially instances of
the inference rules of defeasible logic. The remainder of the transitions do not modify Ci.
For the second part only the last four transitions are relevant. We need to show that, for
each transition and every proof in Di there is a corresponding proof in Di+1, and vice
versa.
For transition 7:
If a proof p in Di applies the inference rule +∆ using r, then the inference rule is still
applicable using r′ and p is also a proof in Di+1. Similarly, if a proof p in Di applies the
inference rule −∆ involving r, then p establishes −∆x, for some x in the body of r. x
cannot be q, since Di ⊢ +∆q. Thus p is also a proof in Di+1.
If a proof p in Di+1 applies the inference rule +∆ using r′, let p′ be a proof in Di of
+∆q. Then the concatenation of p′ and p is a proof in Di. If a proof p in Di+1 applies the
inference rule −∆ involving r′, then p is also a proof in Di.
For transition 8:
Let s be the head of r. If p is a proof in Di containing+σs then p is also a proof in Di+1. If
p is a proof in Di+1 containing+σs, let p′ be a proof in Di of+∂s. Then the concatenation
of p′ and p is a proof in Di.
If p is a proof in Di containing −σs, then there is some literal t in the body of r such
that Di ⊢ −∂t. t cannot be q since, by assumption, Di ⊢ +∂q, and defeasible logic is
coherent. Thus p is also a proof in Di+1. If p is a proof in Di+1 containing−σs, then there
is some literal t in the body of r′ such that Di+1 ⊢ −∂t. We must also have Di ⊢ −∂t,
since the proof in Di+1 cannot use r′, which would introduce circularity. Thus p is also a
proof in Di.
For transition 9:
If a proof p in Di applies the inference rule +∆ it does not use r since Di ⊢ −∆q. Thus p
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is also a proof in Di+1. If a proof p in Di applies the inference rule −∆ then the inference
rule also applies in Di+1. Thus p is also a proof in Di+1.
If a proof p in Di+1 applies the inference rule +∆ then it is also a proof in Di. If a
proof p in Di+1 applies the inference rule −∆ let p′ be a proof in Di of −∆q. Then the
concatenation of p′ and p is a proof in Di.
For transition 10:
Let s be the head of r. If p is a proof in Di containing−σs then p is also a proof in Di+1. If
p is a proof inDi+1 containing−σs, let p′ be a proof inDi of−∂q. Then the concatenation
of p′ and p is a proof in Di.
If p is a proof in Di containing +σs, then the proof of +σs cannot use r, since Di ⊢
−∂q. Thus p is also a proof in Di+1. If p is a proof in Di+1 containing +σs, then p is also
a proof in Di+1.
It follows from the above proof that the transformed defeasible theories are equivalent.
Corollary 1
LetD be a basic defeasible theory with duplicated strict rules. Suppose (D, ∅) =⇒ · · · =⇒
(D′, C′). Then D ≡ D′.
The transition system is complete: it generates all the conclusions that are inferred by
defeasible logic.
Theorem 2
LetD be a basic defeasible theory with duplicated strict rules. Suppose (D, ∅) =⇒ · · · =⇒
(D′, C′) 6=⇒. For every conclusion c, if D′ ⊢ c then c ∈ C′.
Proof
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the theorem does not hold, and let c be a conclusion
of D′ that is not in C′ and has a minimal length proof in D′ among such conclusions.
If c is −∆q then every strict rule with head q has a body literal b such that D′ ⊢ −∆b.
By the assumption, and since the proof for each−∆b must be shorter,−∆b ∈ C′. Since no
more transitions are possible, and considering transition 9, there is no strict rule with head
q. But then, a transition 3 that adds −∆q to C′, is possible, contradicting the assumption.
If c is +∆q then there is a strict rule with head q and D′ ⊢ +∆b for each body literal
b. By the assumption, and since the proof for +∆b must be shorter, +∆b ∈ C′. Since no
more transitions are possible, and considering transition 7, the body of the rule must be
empty. But then, considering transition 1, +∆q ∈ C′, contradicting the assumption.
Similarly, if c is +∂q then there must be a defeasible rule for q with an empty body.
Furthermore, D′ ⊢ −∆∼q, and every defeasible rule for∼q contains a body literal b such
that D′ ⊢ −∂b. By the assumption, −∂b ∈ C′, for each b, and −∆∼q ∈ C′. Since no
more transitions are possible, considering transition 10 there must be no defeasible rules
for∼q. Thus −σ ∼q ∈ C′. Also +σq ∈ C′, since the rule body is empty, and thus the
transition 5 applies, leading to a contradiction.
If c is −∂q then D′ ⊢ −∆q, and either every defeasible rule for q contains a body literal
b such that D′ ⊢ −∂b or D′ ⊢ +∆∼q or and there is a defeasible rule for∼q such that for
all its body literals b′, D′ ⊢ +∂b′. By the assumption, and since any of these proofs must be
shorter than the proof of c,−∆q ∈ C′ and either every defeasible rule for q contains a body
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literal b such that −∂b ∈ C′ or +∆∼q ∈ C′ or and there is a defeasible rule for∼q such
that for all its body literals b′, +∂b′ ∈ C′. But then, since no transitions are possible, and
considering transition 8 and 10, either there are no defeasible rules for q or +∆∼q ∈ C′
or there is a defeasible rule for∼q with an empty body. Considering transitions 2 and 4,
either −σq ∈ C′ or +∆∼q ∈ C′ or +σ∼q ∈ C′. Consequently, because of transition 6,
−∂q ∈ C′, contradicting the original assumption.
Combining the previous two theorems, we can conclude that the transition system com-
putes exactly the conclusions of the initial defeasible logic program.
Theorem 3
LetD be a basic defeasible theory with duplicated strict rules. SupposeD derivesC. Then,
for every conclusion c,
D ⊢ c iff c ∈ C
4 The Linear Algorithm
The algorithm consists of two main parts: (1) a series of transformations to produce an
equivalent basic defeasible theory with duplicated strict rules, and (2) the application of
transitions from the transition system in a computationally efficient order. These parts will
be discussed in separate subsections.
4.1 Transformations
The input to the algorithm is an arbitrary defeasible theory, but the transition system is
proved correct only for basic defeasible theories with duplicated strict rules. To bridge this
gap we must transform the input defeasible theory into the appropriate form.
In (1) three transformations are used to convert any defeasible theory into an equivalent
basic defeasible theory. The first places the defeasible theory in a normal form, the second
eliminates defeaters, and the third reduces the superiority relation to the empty relation.
Let Basic denote this sequence of transformations. We will use Basic in the inference
algorithm.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a definition of Basic; for that, the reader
is referred to (1). However, to give the flavor of the transformations we present one com-
ponent transformation, elim sup, which empties the superiority relation. It introduces two
new propositions for each rule, two rules for each superiority statement, and up to four
rules replacing each original rule. It is defined as follows.
Definition 2
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Let D be a regular defeasible theory with rules R. Let Σ be the language of D.
elim sup(R) = Rs ∪ { ¬inf+(r1)⇒ inf+(r2),
¬inf−(r1)⇒ inf−(r2) | r1 > r2}
∪ { A(r) ⇒ ¬inf+(r),
¬inf+(r)⇒ p,
A(r) ⇒ ¬inf−(r),
¬inf−(r)⇒ p | r ∈ Rd[p]}
∪ { A(r) ⇒ ¬inf−(r),
¬inf−(r)❀ p | r ∈ Rdft[p]}
For each r, inf+(r) and inf−(r) are new atoms not in Σ. Furthermore all new atoms are
distinct.
Intuitively, the two introduced propositions, inf+(r) and inf−(r), represent that r is
inferior to a rule in Rsd (respectively R) that has a defeasibly provable body. If D ⊢
+σinf+(r) then D 6⊢ +∂¬inf+(r) and even when A(r) is proved defeasibly p, the
consequent of r, cannot be established defeasibly using r because the link between the two
is broken.
The transformation to eliminate defeaters is slightly similar to the above transformation;
two propositions are introduced for every proposition in D and up to three rules are used to
replace each rule inD. The two propositions – p+ and p− – introduced for each proposition
p, represent that p (respectively¬p) is not defeated by a defeater. Again, these propositions
form links between antecedent and consequent, and the effect of a defeater is obtained with
a defeasible rule that can break such a link. For more details, see (1).
It is clear that these two transformations are profligate in their introduction of proposi-
tions and generation of rules. Nevertheless, they can be applied in one pass (each) over a
defeasible theory, and the resulting defeasible theory is, at most, a constant factor larger.
The following result was proved in (1), albeit in parts and with slightly different termi-
nology.
Theorem 4 ((1))
Let D be a defeasible theory and let Σ be the language of D. Let D′ =Basic(D).
Then D′ is a basic defeasible theory and, for all conclusions c in Σ,
D ⊢ c iff D′ ⊢ c.
Furthermore, D′ can be constructed in time linear in the size of D, and the size of D′ is
linear in the size of D.
We must also ensure that the basic defeasible theory resulting from Basic has duplicated
strict rules. To guarantee this property we employ the following simple transformation
DupStrict2.
Definition 3
2 This duplication is not strictly necessary since an appropriate separation of definite and defeasible reasoning
is achieved by the transformations of (1). However, in this context, it is simpler to ensure this property by
duplication than to argue that it holds of transformations that are not presented here.
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Let D = (F,R,>). Then DupStrict(D) = (F,R′, >) where
R′ = R ∪ {(r : B ⇒ q) | (r : B → q) ∈ Rs}
It is straightforward to show that DupStrict does not change the conclusions of a theory.
Proposition 1
For any defeasible theory D, and any conclusion c,
D ⊢ c iff DupStrict(D) ⊢ c
Proof
(Sketch) Definite provability is affected only by strict rules and facts. The strict rules in R
and R′ are essentially the same, and the facts are unchanged. Thus definite provability is
unchanged by DupStrict.
In applying the defeasible inference rules, it makes no difference whether a rule is strict
or defeasible. So ⊢′ applied to DupStrict(D) uses effectively the same rules as It also makes
no difference whwther there is one or several copies of a rule.
4.2 The Algorithm
In the algorithm, which is presented in Figure 1, p ranges over literals and s ranges over
conclusions. K and S are sets of conclusions. K accumulates the set of conclusions that
have been proved and used, while S holds those proven conclusions that have not yet been
used to establish more conclusions. D is the input defeasible theory.
To begin the algorithm we reduceD to basic defeasible logic with duplicated strict rules,
as discussed above. We also initialize the set S, that is, we add to S those conclusions that
can immediately be established: all facts are definitely true, as are the heads of strict rules
with empty bodies. The heads of defeasible rules with empty bodies are tentatively true.
Similarly, those literals with no (strict) rules for them are unprovable (strictly).
The algorithm proceeds by modifying the rules in the theory. For strict rules, when infer-
ring positive definite consequences, the algorithm is similar to unit resolution for definite
clauses in classical logic: when an atom is proved, it can be eliminated from the bodies
of all other definite clauses. In this case, when a literal is established definitely it can be
deleted from the body of all rules. Similarly, when it is established that a literal p cannot
be proved then those strict rules which have p as a pre-condition cannot be used to prove
the head, and so they can be deleted. When a strict rule has an empty body, then its head is
definitely provable; when there are no strict rules for a literal, then the literal is unprovable
definitely. When an atom is proved definitely it is eliminated from both strict and defeasible
rules; this necessitates extra code for the case when the body of a defeasible rule becomes
empty.
When establishing tentative provability, we proceed in exactly the same way as with
definite provability, except that we restrict attention to defeasible rules. We can conclude
+σq precisely when the body of a defeasible rule for q becomes empty, and −σq precisely
when there are no more defeasible rules for q.
When establishing defeasible provability, we use the simplified inference rules intro-
duced at the end of Section 2. Each time a statement such as +σp is inferred by the sys-
tem the statement is recorded in the data structure for p and we check to see whether
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D′ = (F ′, R′, ∅) = Basic(D)
R = DupStrict( R′ )
initialize S
K = ∅
while ( S 6= ∅ )
choose s ∈ S and delete s from S
add s to K
case s of
+∆p:
delete all occurrences of p in all rule bodies
whenever a body of a strict rule with head h becomes empty
add +∆h to S
record +∆h,+∂h,+σh
CheckInference( +∆h, S )
whenever a body of a defeasible rule with head h becomes empty
record +σh
CheckInference( +σh, S )
−∆p:
delete all strict rules where p occurs in the body
whenever there are no more strict rules for a literal h, and there is no fact h
add −∆h to S
record −∆h
CheckInference( −∆h, S )
+∂p:
delete all occurrences of p in defeasible rule bodies
whenever a body with head h becomes empty
record +σh
CheckInference( +σh, S )
−∂p:
delete all defeasible rules where p occurs in the body
whenever there are no more defeasible rules for a literal h
record −σh
CheckInference( −σh, S )
end case
end while
Fig. 1. Inference algorithm for defeasible logic
either of the simplified inference rules for ∂ can be applied. This task is performed by
CheckInference, which will add either +∂p or −∂p, if justified, to the set S3. For example,
CheckInference (+σp, S) will check whether −∆∼p and −σ∼p have already been estab-
lished, so that +∂p may be inferred and added to S, and if −∆∼p has been established
will add −∂∼p to S. Similarly, CheckInference(−∆p, S) will check whether +σ∼p and
−σp, so that +∂∼p might be inferred, and will check −σp, +∆∼p and +σ∼p to decide
whether −∂p might be proved.
Execution of this algorithm can be understood as execution of the transition system of
3 Recall that defeasible logic will never infer both +∂p and −∂p since it is coherent (6).
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Section 3. S ∪K combined with the set of recorded extended conclusions in the algorithm
corresponds to Ci in the transition system. The deletions in the algorithm correspond to
transitions 7, 8, 9, and 10. The add statements correspond to transitions 1 and 3. The record
statements correspond to transitions 1, 2, 3, 2, and 4. These transitions are also reflected in
the initialization of S. Finally, CheckInference embodies transitions 5 and 6.
The algorithm corresponds to a restricted form of the transition system where some
sequences of transitions are disallowed. For example, the first case of Figure 1 requires
that all transitions 7 and 8 involving p must occur as a block, uninterrupted by any other
uses of these transitions. Furthermore, the only possible other transitions in the block are
transitions 1 and 2, when p is the last remaining literal in a rule, and transitions 5 and 6
when the recorded information about p triggers them. Note, however, that the algorithm
does not disallow any transitions; it simply restricts the order in which transitions may
occur. Thus the soundness and completeness of the transition system extends to soundness
and completeness of the algorithm.
The key to an efficient implementation of this algorithm is the data structure used to
represent the rules. It is exemplified (albeit incompletely) in Figure 2 for the theory
r1 : b, c, d⇒ a
r2 : ¬b, d,¬e⇒ a
r3 : d,¬e⇒ ¬a
Each rule body is represented as a doubly-linked list (horizontal arrows in Figure 2).
Furthermore, for each literal p there are doubly-linked lists of the occurrences of p in the
bodies of strict (respectively, defeasible) rules (diagonal arrows). For each literal p, there
are doubly-linked lists of the strict (respectively, defeasible) rules for p (dashed arrows).
Each literal occurrence has a link to the record for the rule it occurs in (not shown in
Figure 2). As mentioned above, each literal p holds information showing which extended
conclusions about p have been established, and there is also a link to the corresponding
data structure for ∼p.
r1      a b c d
r2      a ¬b d ¬e
r3    ¬a d ¬e
d ¬eca
Fig. 2. Data Structure for Rules
This data structure allows the deletion of literals and rules in time proportional to the
number of literals deleted. Furthermore, we can detect in constant time whether a literal
deleted was the only literal in that body, and whether a rule deleted with head h was the
only strict (defeasible) rule for h. Each literal occurrence is deleted at most once, and the
test for empty body is made at most once per deletion. Similarly, each rule is deleted at
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most once, and the test for no more rules is made once per deletion. The cost of a call to
CheckInference is constant, since all checking relies on data that is immediately available,
and at most 3 checks are needed per call. Thus the cost of the main part of the algorithm is
O(N), where N is the number of literal occurrences in D′.
Furthermore, the initialization of S is supported by the data structure and has cost pro-
portional to the number of propositions in D′. Note that S can be implemented as a queue
or a stack, since the only operations on S are to test for emptiness, add an element, or
choose and delete an element. These operations require only constant time, and the num-
ber of operations is, in the worst case, proportional to the number of rules in D′. Since
the initial transformations (1) that produce D′ are linear, the cost of the entire algorithm is
linear in the size of D.
Theorem 5
The consequences of a defeasible theory D can be computed in O(N) time, where N is
the number of symbols in D.
This algorithm, when restricted to positive definite conclusions, is similar to the bottom-
up linear algorithm for determining satisfiability of Horn clauses of Dowling and Gallier
(11; 12). One difference is in the data structures: the Dowling-Gallier algorithm keeps a
count of the number of atoms in the body of a rule, rather than keep track of the body.
The latter results in greater memory usage, but allows us to reconstruct the residue of the
computation: the simplified rules that remain. This residue is useful in understanding the
behaviour of a theory, and can be useful in some applications of defeasible logic.
5 Discussion
There seem to be several inter-related features of defeasible logic that contribute to its
linear complexity:
• form of failure
The form of failure-to-prove exhibited in the proof conditions for −∆ and −∂ is
closely related to Kunen’s semantics for logic programs with negation-as-failure
(22). This form of failure does not include looping failures, and the propositional
form is known to have linear complexity.
• static and local nature of conflict
When trying to derive +∂q or −∂q it is sufficient to look at rules for q and∼ q,
since∼q is the only literal that conflicts with q. Thus the set of conflicting rules is
unchanging and readily apparent. In logics where there is no bound on the number
of conflicting literals and/or the conflicting rules cannot be known a priori (for ex-
ample, plausible logic (8)) the corresponding inference rules for +∂ and −∂ can be
expected to be more complex.
• linear cost elimination of superiority relation
Defeaters can be handled as a variant of defeasible rules using the techniques of Sec-
tion 4. The presence of a superiority relation complicates these techniques greatly,
although it is clear that there is a linear direct implementation of full defeasible logic
by imitating the elimination transformation. The elimination of the superiority rela-
tion is based on a simple syntactic transformation (1), but a similar transformation
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has been proposed for other logics (19) that have higher complexity. The success
of such a simple transformation can be partly attributed to the static nature of the
superiority relation and the static and local nature of conflicting literals, which do
not change over the course of evaluation.
A significant non-factor in the complexity of defeasible logic is the team defeat aspect of
the logic. This might be expected to create some difficulties since, conceptually, two teams
of rules are pitted against each other, and this might give rise to combinatorial problems.
However, reformulating the issue as one of competing/conflicting literals clarifies that there
is a fixed number of pieces of information that are of interest, and each rule can contribute
individually.
We can expect that similar logics, such as the variants discussed in (2) and variants
where strict rules are superior to defeasible rules (28), also have linear complexity and are
amenable to the techniques used here, although the details will require careful verification.
Similarly, well-founded defeasible logic (22) can be expected to have quadratic complexity,
since it employs the well-founded semantics (32) notion of failure, which has quadratic
complexity.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that propositional defeasible logic has linear complexity. The algorithm
that we have presented here has been implemented as the system Delores (24) and has un-
dergone a preliminary experimental evaluation (23). It executes simple, but large, theories
of basic defeasible logic very quickly. The linear complexity of the algorithm is supported
empirically.
However, the transformations used to convert an arbitrary defeasible theory to the ap-
propriate form for the algorithm of Figure 1 impose a large constant factor on the cost of
initializing S. Although the cause has not been pinpointed, it appears to be derived from
the multiplication of rules and propositions during the transformations. It should be possi-
ble to improve performance by integrating the transformations of (1) more tightly and/or
abandoning the design goal (1) of incrementality of the transformations (with respect to
changes in the original defeasible theory).
Work is proceeding on improvements to the implementation of defeasible logic and the
application of similar techniques to implement well-founded defeasible logic. We propose
to use the implementation to support reasoning about regulations (4).
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